

**Third International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare
University of Maastricht, The Netherlands, June 22–25, 1996**

PROGRAM

SATURDAY June 22 1996: 9.00–11.30

SESSION A	CHAIR: Salvador Barbéra	<i>Strategy-Proofness I</i>
9.00–9.25	Dolors Berga	<i>Strategy-Proof Voting Schemes and Single-Plateaued Preferences</i>
9.25–9.50	Stephen Ching	<i>Non-Manipulable General Decision Schemes</i>
9.50–10.15	Wouter Peremans* Ton Storcken	<i>Strategy-Proof Location of Public Bads</i>
10.15–10.40	Shigehiro Serizawa	<i>Strategy-Proof and Symmetric Choice Functions for Public Good Economies</i>
10.40–11.05	Hans van der Stel	<i>Strategy-Proofness, Pareto Optimality and Strictly Convex Norms</i>

SESSION B	CHAIR: Erik Schokkaert	<i>Ethics</i>
9.00–9.25	Philippe Mongin Claude d'Aspremont*	<i>Utility Theory and Ethics</i>
9.25–9.50	Kjell Arne Brekke* Richard Howarth	<i>Is Welfarism Compatible with Sustainability?</i>
9.50–10.15	Serge Kolm	<i>The Definition of the Social Optimum: The Impossible Methods and the Right One</i>
10.15–10.40	John Roemer	<i>Equality of Opportunity: A Theory and Examples</i>
10.40–11.05	Hans-Peter Weikard	<i>The Rawlsian Principles of Justice Reconsidered</i>

SESSION C	CHAIR: Randolph Sloof	<i>Taxation</i>
9.00–9.25	Robert Owen* Hans Peters	<i>Optimal International Tax Coordination and Economic Integration: A Game-Theoretic Framework</i>
9.25–9.50	Peter Lambert* Xavier Ramos	<i>Horizontal Inequity and Vertical Redistribution</i>
9.50–10.15	Patrick Moyes	<i>Minimal Equal Sacrifice Theories and Income Taxation</i>
10.15–10.40	Pasi Holm Erkki Koskela*	<i>Tax Progression, Structure of Labour Taxation and Employment</i>
10.40–11.05	Hans Maks	<i>Competition Policy and Imperfect Information</i>

SESSION D	CHAIR: Sergei Guriev	<i>Computational Methods I</i>
9.00–9.25	Pavel Chebotarev* Elena Shamis	<i>From Incomplete Preferences to Ranking via Optimization</i>
9.25–9.50	Andranik Tanguian* J. Gruber	<i>Constructing Quadratic, Polynomial, and Separable Objective Functions</i>
9.50–10.15	Andrey Malishevski	<i>Constructing Generalized Utility on the Basis of Opportunity Set Values</i>
10.15–10.40	Ludmilla Koshlai* Mikhail Mikhalevich	<i>Ordinary Regression Methods for Preference Indicator Construction</i>
10.40–11.05	Mikhail Mikhalevich	<i>One Approach to Utility Theory Development for Nontransitive Preferences</i>

11.05–11.30 COFFEE BREAK (Trefcentrum, near registration desk)

SATURDAY June 22 1996: 11.30–14.00

SESSION A	CHAIR: Nir Dagan	<i>Strategy-Proofness II</i>
11.30–11.55	Salvador Barbéra* Bhaskar Dutta	<i>Teams, Adverse Selection and Strategy-Proof Reward Schemes</i>
11.55–12.20	James Schummer	<i>Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency on Restricted Economic Domains</i>
12.20–12.45	Salvador Barbéra Anna Bogomolnaia* Hans van der Stel	<i>Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Expected Utility Maximizers</i>

SESSION B	CHAIR: Nick Baigent	<i>Social Preferences</i>
11.30–11.55	Marc Fleurbaey* Philippe Michel	<i>On Intertemporal Social Preferences</i>
11.55–12.20	Geert Dhaene Erik Schokkaert* Carine Van de Voorde	<i>Risk Structure Compensation in Health Care: An Application of the Theory of Fair Compensation</i>
12.20–12.45	Walter Bossert Marc Fleurbaey Dirk van de Gaer*	<i>On Second-Best Compensation</i>

SESSION C	CHAIR: Harold Houba	<i>Games and Applications I</i>
11.30–11.55	Hélène Ferrer	<i>Endogenous Coalition Formation in Asymmetric Oligopolies</i>
11.55–12.20	Doron Sonsino	<i>The Bayesian Stability of Pareto Efficiency</i>
12.20–12.45	Alexander Vasin	<i>Models of Price Competition: The Dominance Elimination and Adaptive Behavior</i>

SESSION D	CHAIR: Pavel Chebotarev	<i>Computational Methods II</i>
11.30–11.55	Michael Bernstam Sergei Guriev* Alexander Petrov Igor Pospelov	<i>Stimulation of Economic Growth through Restoration of Savings</i>
11.55–12.20	Hsih-chia Hsieh	<i>Core, Cooperation and Computability</i>
12.20–12.45	Alexander Petrov	<i>Integrability Conditions and Social Welfare Functions</i>

12.45–14.00 LUNCH BREAK (Mensa)

SATURDAY June 22 1996: 14.00–16.00

SESSION A	CHAIR: Hans van der Stel	<i>Strategy-Proofness III</i>
14.00–14.25	Stefano Vannucci	<i>Strategy-Proofness and Monotonicity of Choice Aggregation Rules</i>
14.25–14.50	Shasikanta Nandeibam	<i>An Alternative Proof of Gibbard's Random Dictatorship Result</i>
14.50–15.15	Navin Aswal Arunava Sen*	<i>Restricted Domains and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Result</i>
15.15–15.40	Dominique Lepelley Fabrice Valognes*	<i>More on Statistical Manipulability of Social Choice Functions</i>

SESSION B	CHAIR: Zvi Safra	<i>Preference Aggregation</i>
14.00–14.25	Nick Baigent	<i>Buchanan, Sen and the Scope of Arrow's Impossibility</i>
14.25–14.50	Hsueh-Ling Huynh	<i>On Metrically Conservative Societies</i>
14.50–15.15	Ton Storcken	<i>Intransitive Aggregated Preferences</i>
15.15–15.40	Lev Sholomov	<i>Aggregation of Transitive Preference Relations</i>

SESSION C	CHAIR: Claude d'Aspremont	<i>Noncooperative games</i>
14.00–14.25	Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro Peter Borm* Freek van Meegen	<i>Protective Behaviour in Games</i>
14.25–14.50	Joseph Greenberg	<i>Stable (Incomplete) Contracts in Dynamic Games: Worlds Apart ... but Acting Together</i>
14.50–15.15	Mark Johnson	<i>Algebraic Complexity of Strategy-Implementing Semiautomatons for Repeated-Play Games</i>
15.15–15.40	Licun Xue	<i>Self-Enforcing Agreements in Infinitely Repeated Games</i>

SESSION D	CHAIR: Andranik Tanguian	<i>Computational Methods III</i>
14.00–14.25	Martijn Houtman	<i>A Nonparametric Approach to Efficiency Measures</i>
14.25–14.50	Igor Pospelov	<i>Using a Nonparametric Method for Constructing Economical Indices</i>
14.50–15.15	L. Ya. Pospelova	<i>"INDEX" - A Tool for Calculating Aggregated Indices of Consumer Demand Based on a Nonparametric Method for Analysis and Forecasts</i>
15.15–15.40	A.A. Shananin	<i>Integrability Conditions, Aggregation of Consumer Demand and Problems of Generalised Programming</i>

15.40–16.00 COFFEE BREAK (Trefcentrum, near registration desk)

SATURDAY June 22 1996: 16.00–18.45

SESSION A	CHAIR: Arunava Sen	<i>Walrasian Equilibria</i>
16.00–16.25	José Cordoba Peter Hammond*	<i>Asymptotically Walrasian Strategy-Proof Exchange</i>
16.25–16.50	Nir Dagan	<i>Consistency and the Walrasian Allocations Correspondence</i>
16.50–17.15	Chen-Zhong Qin Lloyd Shapley Ken-ichi Shimomura*	<i>A Limit Theorem on the Walras Core of an Economy</i>

SESSION B	CHAIR: Ton Storcken	<i>Social Welfare Functions</i>
16.00–16.25	Christophe Gonzales	<i>Utilitarianism with Individual Variations in Utility</i>
16.25–16.50	Edi Karni Zvi Safra*	<i>Individual Sense of Justice and Social Welfare Functions</i>
16.50–17.15	A.V. Vladimirov	<i>Preference Aggregation Rules in Infinite Setting Social Welfare Functions</i>

SESSION C	CHAIR: Marlies Klemish-Ahlert	<i>Games and Applications II</i>
16.00–16.25	Harold Houba* Koos Sneek Felix Várdy	<i>Can Negotiations Prevent Fish Wars?</i>
16.25–16.50	Henk Folmer Pierre van Mouche*	<i>Interconnected Games and International Environmental Problems</i>
16.50–17.15	Randolph Sloof* Frans van Winden	<i>A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Lobbying and Pressure</i>

SESSION D	CHAIR: Andranik Tanguian	<i>Software Session</i>
16.00–16.25	Andranik Tanguian	<i>A WINDOWS Interactive Program for Constructing Objective Functions</i>
16.25–16.50		<i>To be announced</i>
16.50–17.15		<i>To be announced</i>

17.30–18.30 **PLenary SESSION (Aula)** **CHAIR: John Weymark**

John Harsanyi *Utilities, Preferences and Substantive Goods*

SUNDAY June 23 1996: 9.00–11.00

SESSION A	CHAIR: John Roemer	<i>Inequality</i>
9.00–9.25	Yoram Amiel* Frank Cowell	<i>Income Transformation and Income Inequality</i>
9.25–9.50	Valentino Dardanoni* Antonio Forcina	<i>Statistical Inference for the Lorenz Curve Ordering</i>
9.50–10.15	Udo Ebert	<i>Using Equivalence Scales to Compare Income Distributions when Household Types are Different</i>
10.15–10.40	Tapan Mitra Efe A. Ok*	<i>On the Measurement of Economic Poverty</i>

SESSION B	CHAIR: Maurice Salles	<i>(Fuzzy) Preferences</i>
9.00–9.25	Margarita Estévez* Carlos Hervés Amelia Verdejo	<i>Some Results on the Existence of Continuous Extension and Representation of Pseudotransitive Preferences</i>
9.25–9.50	Manabendra Dasgupta* Rajat Deb	<i>Factoring Fuzzy Transitivity</i>
9.50–10.15	Prasanta Pattanaik* Kunal Sengupta	<i>On the Structure of Simple Preference-Based Choice Functions</i>
10.15–10.40	Pavel Chebotarev	<i>Incomplete Preferences and Indirect Scores</i>

SESSION C	CHAIR: Sven berg	<i>Voting I</i>
9.00–9.25	Steven Brams* Marc Kilgour William Zwicker	<i>A New Paradox of Vote Aggregation</i>
9.25–9.50	Ad van Deemen	<i>The Probability of the Paradox of Voting for Weak Order Preferences</i>
9.50–10.15	Annick Laruelle* Mika Widgrén	<i>Is the Allocation of Voting Power Among EU States Fair?</i>
10.15–10.40	Honorata Sosnowska	<i>Shapley Values for Pre-Election Polls</i>

SESSION D	CHAIR: Steve Ching	<i>(Re)allocation</i>
9.00–9.25	Walter Bossert	<i>Welfarist Solutions for Allocation Problems with Indivisibilities</i>
9.25–9.50	Bettina Klaus* Hans Peters Ton Storcken	<i>Reallocation of an Infinitely Divisible Good</i>
9.50–10.15	William Thomson	<i>Resource Allocation in Economies with Individual Endowments and Single-Peaked Preferences</i>
10.15–10.40	Carmen Herrero Michael Maschler Antonio Villar*	<i>Personal Rights and Collective Ownership: The Rights-Egalitarian Solution</i>

10.40–11.00 COFFEE BREAK (Trefcentrum, near registration desk)

SUNDAY June 23 1996: 11.00–13.30

SESSION A	CHAIR: Frédéric Gaspart	<i>Matchings</i>
11.00–11.25	Matthew Jackson* Thomas Palfrey	<i>Dynamic Efficiency and Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Matching</i>
11.25–11.50	Bhaskar Dutta Jordi Massó*	<i>Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have Preferences over Colleagues</i>
11.50–12.15	Carmen Herrero* Iñigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe Jorge Nieto	<i>Ranking Social Decisions without Individual Preferences on the Basis of Opportunities</i>

SESSION B	CHAIR: Hervé Moulin	<i>Cost Sharing</i>
11.00–11.25	Alison Watts	<i>Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Cost Sharing Games</i>
11.25–11.50	Maurice Koster* Stef Tijs Peter Borm	<i>Serial Cost Sharing Methods for Multi-Commodity Situations</i>
11.50–12.15	Stef Tijs* Maurice Koster	<i>The Aggregate Serial Cost Sharing Rule</i>

SESSION C	CHAIR: Peter Borm	<i>Games and Applications III</i>
11.00–11.25	Benedetto Gui	<i>On "Relational Goods": Strategic Implications of Investment in Relationships</i>
11.25–11.50	Michael Jones	<i>The Classification of Continuation Probabilities</i>
11.50–12.15	Indrajit Ray	<i>Games with Identical Equilibrium Payoffs</i>

12.30–13.30 PLENARY SESSION (Aula) CHAIR: Stef Tijs
Hervé Moulin *Strategy-Proofness: News from the Front*

SUNDAY June 23: 13.30–21.00

13.30–14.30 Editors' Meeting (Corona Room)

16.00–17.30 GUIDED CITY TOURS (Starting at Conference Building)

18.30 CONFERENCE DINNER (Bondefanten Museum)

SESSION A	CHAIR: Serge Kolm	<i>Equity and Efficiency</i>
9.00–9.25	Satya Chakravarty	<i>Relative Deprivation and Satisfaction Orderings</i>
9.25–9.50	Richard Cornes* Emilson Silva	<i>Transfers between Jurisdictions with Private Information: The Equity/Efficiency Tradeoff</i>
9.50–10.15	François Maniquet	<i>A Strong Incompatibility Between Efficiency and Equity in Non-Convex Economies</i>
10.15–10.40	Efe Ok	<i>On the Impossibility of Opportunity Inequality Measurement</i>
10.40–11.05		

SESSION B	CHAIR: Steven Brams	<i>Voting II</i>
9.00–9.25	Sven Berg	<i>Indirect Voting Systems and Majority Functions</i>
9.25–9.50	Krishna Ladha* Gary Miller Joe Oppenheimer	<i>Democracy: Turbo-Charged or Shackled? Information Aggregation by Majority Rule</i>
9.50–10.15	Andreas Pfingsten* Andreas Wagener	<i>The Manipulation of Sequential Choice Procedures</i>
10.15–10.40	Bettina Klaus	<i>Strategy-Proof Division of a Private Good: Single-Peaked and Single-Dipped Preferences</i>
10.40–11.05		

SESSION C	CHAIR: Stef Tijs	<i>TU-games I</i>
9.00–9.25	M. Josune Albizuri* J. Carlos Santos J. Manuel Zarzuelo	<i>An Axiomatic Approach to a Value for Games with n Players and r Alternatives</i>
9.25–9.50	Irinel Dragan	<i>New Mathematical Properties of the Least Squares Values</i>
9.50–10.15	Jean Derks Jeroen Kuipers*	<i>Implementing the Simplex Method for Computing the Prenucleolus of TU-Games</i>
10.15–10.40	Jeroen Kuipers Tamás Solymosi* Harry Aarts	<i>Computing the Nucleolus of Some Combinatorially-Structured Games</i>
10.40–11.05	Peter Sudhölter* Bezalel Peleg	<i>Nucleoli as Unique Minimizers of Collective Excess Functions</i>

SESSION D	CHAIR: Matthew Jackson	<i>Implementation</i>
9.00–9.25	Sandeep Baliga Luis Corchon Tomas Sjöström*	<i>The Theory of Implementation when the Planner is a Player</i>
9.25–9.50	Sandeep Baliga Tomas Sjöström*	<i>Interactive Implementation</i>
9.50–10.15	Johan Eyckmans	<i>Nash Implementation of a Proportional Solution to International Pollution Control Problems</i>
10.15–10.40	Frédéric Gaspard	<i>A General Concept of Procedural Fairness for One-Stage Implementation</i>
10.40–11.05		

11.05–11.20 COFFEE BREAK (Trefcentrum, near registration desk)

MONDAY June 24 1996: 11.20–13.45

SESSION A	CHAIR: Andreas Pfingsten	Agency
11.20–11.45	Mehmet Bac	<i>Corruption and Supervision Costs in Hierarchies</i>
11.45–12.10	Jean Hindriks* Micheal Keen Abhinay Muthoo	<i>Corruption, Evasion and Extortion</i>
12.10–12.35	Didier Laussel Michel Le Breton*	<i>The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Common Agency</i>

SESSION B	CHAIR: Pieter Ruys	Bargaining and Revealed Preference
11.20–11.45	Maria del Carmen Marco* Josep Peris Begoña Subiza	<i>A Mechanism for Meta-Bargaining Problems</i>
11.45–12.10	M. Carmen Sánchez-Antón	<i>Rationality of Bargaining Solutions</i>
12.10–12.35	Lin Zhou	<i>Nash Bargaining Theory and the Revealed Preference Theory for Non-Convex Problems</i>

SESSION C	CHAIR: Peter Sudhölter	TU-games II
11.20–11.45	Jean Derks	<i>Linear Values Based on Dividend Distributions</i>
11.45–12.10	Gerard van der Laan* René van den Brink	<i>An Axiomatic Class of Share Functions for n-Person Games</i>
12.10–12.35	C. Rafels* Stef Tijs	<i>On the Cores of Cooperative Games and the Stability of the Weber Set</i>

SESSION D	CHAIR: Annemarie ter Veer	Politics and Coalitions
11.20–11.45	Hans Gersbach	<i>Public Information and Social Choice</i>
11.45–12.10	Miranda de Vries* Ad van Deemen	<i>A Policy Distance Theory of Coalition Formation in Spatial Voting Games</i>
12.10–12.35	Andrey Malishevski	<i>An Axiomatics for Pairwise Coalition Comparisons Generated by An Underlying Order</i>

12:35–13.45 LUNCH BREAK (Trefcentrum, near registration desk)

SESSION A	CHAIR: Lin Zhou	<i>Rationalizability</i>
13.45–14.10	Mark Johnson Richard Dean*	<i>An Algebraic Characterization of Path Independent Choice Functions</i>
14.10–14.35	Wulf Gaertner* Yongsheng Xu	<i>On Rationalizability of Choice Functions: A Characterization of the Median</i>
14.35–15.00	Ton Storcken Pieter Ruys*	<i>Extensions of Choice Behaviour</i>
15.00–15.25		

SESSION B	CHAIR: William Thomson	<i>Bargaining I</i>
13.45–14.10	Rudy Douven Jacob Engwerda*	<i>Properties of N-person Axiomatic Bargaining Solutions if the Pareto Frontier is Twice Differentiable and Strictly Concave</i>
14.10–14.35	Marlies Klemish-Ahlert	<i>International Environmental Negotiations with Compensation or Redistribution</i>
14.35–15.00	Somdeb Lahiri	<i>A Reduced Game Property for the Egalitarian Solution</i>
15.00–15.25	Kim Border Uzi Segal*	<i>Preferences over Solutions to the Bargaining Problem</i>

SESSION C	CHAIR: Theo Driessen	<i>TU-games III</i>
13.45–14.10	Frédéric Chantreuil	<i>Axiomatics of Level Structure Values</i>
14.10–14.35	M. Vázquez-Brage Anne van den Nouweland* Ignacio García-Jurado	<i>Owen's Coalitional Value and Aircraft Landing Fees</i>
14.35–15.00	Marco Slikker	<i>Communication Situations with a Hierarchical Player Partition</i>
15.00–15.25		

SESSION D	CHAIR: Alain Trannoy	<i>Freeriding</i>
13.45–14.10	Moshe Adler* Masako Darrough	<i>Private Street Cleaning in 19th Century New York</i>
14.10–14.35	George Bulkley Gareth Myles*	<i>Why do Individuals Choose to Join Trade Unions? A Model of Rational Union Membership</i>
14.35–15.00	Donald Keenan Iltae Kim Ronald Warren*	<i>Voluntary Public-Good Provision under Uncertainty with Nash and Non-Nash Behavior</i>
15.00–15.25	Tatsuyoshi Saijo Takehiko Yamato*	<i>Fundamental Difficulties in the Provision of Public Goods: A Solution to the Free Rider Problem Twenty Years After</i>

15.25–15.55 COFFEE BREAK (Trefcentrum, near registration desk)

MONDAY June 24 1996: 15.55–20.00

SESSION A	CHAIR: Carmen Herrero	Preferences
15.55–16.20	Klaus Nehring	<i>Public-Minded Preference: An Impossibility Theorem and its Resolution</i>
16.20–16.45	M. Besada C. Vázquez*	<i>The Uniform Properness Property: A Characterization</i>
16.45–17.10	Yew-Kwang Ng	<i>The Paradox of Interpersonal Cardinal Utility: A Proposed Solution</i>

SESSION B	CHAIR: Joseph Greenberg	Bargaining II
15.55–16.20	Marco Mariotti	<i>An Axiomatic Approach to Bargaining over a Finite Number of Alternatives</i>
16.20–16.45	Clara Ponsati* József Sákovics	<i>Rubinstein Bargaining with Two-sided Outside Options</i>
16.45–17.10	Vincent Vannetelbosch	<i>N-Person Sequential Bargaining: Rationalizability and Endogenous Procedure</i>

SESSION C	CHAIR: Carles Rafels	TU-Games IV
15.55–16.20	Yukihiko Funaki	<i>Multiple Simple Games and Additive Value of Set Games</i>
16.20–16.45	Theo Driessen	<i>Pairwise-Bargained Consistency and Cooperative Game Theory: The Case of a Two-Sided Economic Model</i>
16.45–17.10	Tsuneyuki Namekata* Theo Driessen	<i>Pairwise-Bargained Consistency: Relationship between τ-Value and Nucleolus through an Associated Bimatrix Game</i>

SESSION D	CHAIR: Ton Storcken	Inconsistency in Tournaments
15.55–16.20	Robert Delver* Herman Monsuur	<i>Echelons in Incomplete Relations</i>
16.20–16.45	Herman Monsuur* Ton Storcken	<i>Measuring Inconsistency</i>
16.45–17.10	Laurent Vidu	<i>Separable Preferences and Separable Tournaments</i>

17.15–18.15 PLENARY SESSION (Aula) CHAIR: Amartya Sen
 Kotaro Suzumura *Welfare, Rights and Choice Procedures*

18.30 RECEPTION by the University of Maastricht (Vrijthof 36)

SESSION A	CHAIR: Wulf Gaertner	<i>Opportunity Sets</i>
9.00–9.25	Ricardo Arlegi* Jorge Nieto	<i>Preference for Flexibility: An Axiomatic Approach</i>
9.25–9.50	Alejandro Neme Jorge Nieto* Luis Quintas	<i>Ranking Opportunity Sets: Freedom of Choice and the Cost of Information</i>
9.50–10.15	Salvador Barbera Birgit Grodal*	<i>Ranking Sets of Future Opportunities</i>
9.50–10.15		

SESSION B	CHAIR: Ad van Deemen	<i>Voting and (Simple) Games</i>
9.00–9.25	Marcin Malawski	<i>On Representation and Association Agreements in Voting Games</i>
9.25–9.50	Nicolas Andjiga Boniface Mbih*	<i>Core Stability of Generalized Simple Games</i>
9.50–10.15	Annemarie ter Veer* Harrie de Swart	<i>Coherent Coalitional Agreements</i>
10.15–10.40	William Zwicker	<i>What is the “Right” Desirability Relation for Coalitions, and which Weakening of Weightedness does it Characterize?</i>

SESSION C	CHAIR: Rajat Deb	<i>Public Goods I</i>
9.00–9.25	Hideo Konishi* Michel Le Breton Shlomo Weber	<i>Equilibrium in a Local Public Good Economy</i>
9.25–9.50	Julian Manning	<i>Local Public Goods: First Best Allocations and Supporting Prices</i>
9.50–10.15	Guofu Tan	<i>External Threats, Incentive Schemes, and the Provision of Collective Goods</i>
10.15–10.40	Charles Kahn Emilson Silva*	<i>Optimal Provision of Rivalrous Public Goods with Costly Exclusion, Corruption and Endogenous Fines</i>

SESSION D	CHAIR: Horst Zank	<i>(Collective) Decisions and Uncertainty</i>
9.00–9.25	Krishna Ladha	<i>Hypothesis Testing and the Condorcet Jury Theorem</i>
9.25–9.50	Bruno Bassan Marco Scarsini*	<i>Sequential Decisions with Several Agents</i>
9.50–10.15	Elchanan Ben-Porath Itzhak Gilboa David Schmeidler*	<i>Social Welfare under Uncertainty</i>
10.15–10.40		

10.40–10.55 COFFEE BREAK (Trefcentrum, near registration desk)

TUESDAY June 25 1996: 10.55–13.35

SESSION A	CHAIR: Peter Hammond	<i>Utility Aggregation</i>
10.55–11.20	Anna Khmel'nitskaya	<i>Social Welfare Orderings for Different Combinations of Individual Utilities Scales</i>
11.20–11.45	Yew-kwang Ng	<i>From Separability to Unweighted Sum: A Case for Utilitarianism</i>
11.45–12.10	Andranik Tanguian	<i>Equality of a Large Society Decisions Based on Ordinal or Cardinal Utilities (with Applications to Borda and Condorcet Winners)</i>
12.10–12.35	John Weymark	<i>Welfarism on Saturating Domains</i>

SESSION B	CHAIR: Michel Le Breton	<i>Pairwise Majority Tournaments</i>
10.55–11.20	Philippe de Donder* Michel Le Breton Michel Truchon	<i>The C2 Social Choice Correspondences: A Set-Theoretical Comparison</i>
11.20–11.45	Gilbert Laffond Jean Laine*	<i>How to Choose from a Tournament? The Effects of Representative Democracy</i>
11.45–12.10	Jean-François Laslier	<i>Tournament Algebras and Binary Trees</i>
12.10–12.35	V.S. Levchenkov	<i>Cyclic Tournaments: A Matching Solution</i>

SESSION C	CHAIR: Hideo Konishi	<i>Public Goods II</i>
10.55–11.20	Rajat Deb* Tae Kun Seo	<i>Strategy-Proofness, Theories of Justice and the Ability to Pay Principle of Sharing the Cost of a Public Project</i>
11.20–11.45	Marcus Berliant Frank Page*	<i>Optimal Budget Balancing Income Tax Mechanisms and the Provision of Public Goods</i>
11.45–12.10	Rajat Deb Laura Razzolini* Tae Kun Seo	<i>Strategy-Proof Cost Sharing, Ability to Pay and Free Provision of an Indivisible Public Good</i>
12.10–12.35	Régis Renault Alain Trannoy*	<i>The Forced to Pay Yet Free to Choose Procedure for Provision of Public Goods Bundle</i>

SESSION D	CHAIR: David Schmeidler	<i>(Non)expected Utility</i>
10.55–11.20	Han Bleichrodt* Peter Wakker Magnus Johannesson	<i>Characterizing QALY's by Means of Risk Neutrality</i>
11.20–11.45	Peter Wakker* Amos Tversky	<i>Properties of the Weighting Function in Cumulative Prospect Theory</i>
11.45–12.10	Peter Wakker Horst Zank*	<i>State Dependent Expected Utility for Savage's State Space</i>
12.10–12.35		

12.35–13.35 LUNCH BREAK (Trefcentrum, near registration desk)

TUESDAY June 25 1996: 13.35–15.30

SESSION A	CHAIR: Josep Peris	Scoring Rules
13.35–14.00	William Gehrlein	<i>The Sensitivity of Weight Selection on the Condorcet Efficiency of Weighted Scoring Rules</i>
14.00–14.25	Thierry Marchant	<i>Cardinal Properties of the Borda Score</i>
14.25–14.50	Vincent Merlin	<i>Scoring Runoff Methods are Consistent</i>
14.50–15.15	Michel Le Breton Michel Truchon*	<i>A Borda Measure for Social Choice Functions</i>

SESSION B	CHAIR: Kotaro Suzumura	Freedom and Rights
13.35–14.00	Sebastiano Bavetta Marco del Seta*	<i>Rough Set Approximations and the Syntax of Freedom</i>
14.00–14.25	Martin van Hees	<i>On the Analysis of Negative Freedom</i>
14.25–14.50	Ahmet Kara	<i>The Pareton Liberal Paradox with Intransitive Individual Preferences: Are there Social Choice Contexts where a Society of Irrational Individuals is more Rational than a Society of Rational Individuals?</i>
14.50–15.15		

SESSION C	CHAIR: Frank Page	Equilibrium and Core
13.35–14.00	Myrna Wooders	<i>Arbitrage, Equilibrium and the Core</i>
14.00–14.25	Hans Haller	<i>Household Decisions and Equilibrium Efficiency</i>
14.25–14.50	Alexander Kovalenkov* Myrna Wooders	<i>Approximate Cores of Arbitrary Games Without Side Payments</i>
14.50–15.15		

SESSION D	CHAIR: Jean-Jacques Herings	Norms and Policies
13.35–14.00	Maarten Vendrik	<i>Dynamics of a Household Norm in Female Labour Supply</i>
14.00–14.25		
14.25–14.50	N. Bocard* P. Wunsch T. van Ypersele	<i>European Social Policy</i>
14.50–15.15	Gianfranco Gambarelli	<i>Minimax Multi-Ordered Apportionments</i>

15.15–15.30 COFFEE BREAK (Trefcentrum, near registration desk)

TUESDAY June 25 1996: 15.30–18.20

SESSION A	CHAIR: William Gehrlein	<i>Social Choice Rules</i>
15.30–15.55	Emilio Calvo* Iñaki Garcia Esther Gutierrez	<i>Scoring Rules: A Game-Theoretic Approach</i>
15.55–16.20	M. Carmen Sánchez-Antón Josep Peris*	<i>Veto in Fixed Agenda Social Choice Correspondences</i>
16.20–16.45	Sjoerd Romme	<i>Pareto Optimality and Social Choice: Unanimity Rule Reconsidered</i>
16.45–17.10	Hervé Cres* Yves Balasko	<i>Condorcet Cycles in Bipolarized Societies</i>

SESSION B	CHAIR: Bettina Klaus	<i>Arrow Social Choice</i>
15.30–15.55	John Craven	<i>Best Fit Social Choices: An Alternative to Arrow</i>
15.55–16.20	Vincenzo Denicolò	<i>No-Envy and Arrow's Condition</i>
16.20–16.45	Nicolas Gravel* Jean-François Laslier Alain Trannoy	<i>Consistency Between Values and Tastes: A Veil of Ignorance Approach</i>
16.45–17.10	Anton Stefanescu	<i>Impossibility Results for Choice Correspondences</i>

SESSION C	CHAIR: Hans Haller	<i>Politics and Economics</i>
15.30–15.55	Jean-Jacques Herings	<i>On the Genetic Occurrence of Price Regulations</i>
15.55–16.20	Karine Nyborg	<i>Project Evaluation and Political Judgements</i>
16.20–16.45	John Roemer	<i>Why the Poor do not Expropriate the Rich in Democracies: A New Argument</i>
16.45–17.10	Michael Kaganovich Itzhak Zilcha*	<i>Investment in Education and Social Security in an Inter-generational Framework</i>

17.20–18.20 PLENARY SESSION CHAIR: Prasanta Pattanaik
Amartya Sen (Title to be announced)

18.20 DRINKS (Kruithuis)